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"Different quarters have requested me many a time to promulgate Martial 
Law. But we had unflinching faith in the political system and as a result did 
not pay heed to such requests." 
Lieutenant-General H.M. Ershad 
(June 1982, after imposing martial law) 
"What the powerful want is assurance that their power is held rightfully" 
Elizabeth Janeway 
The Powers of the Weak, 1980 
e political life of Bangladesh is punctuated by the imposition and withdrawal of 
artial law. Conversely, military rule is interrupted by party politics. My objectives 
e to show how, in this volatile context, government penetration into d l  aspects of 
adesh's mass media is continuously and sometimes effectively 
r-balanced by the populace, using communication strategies as political 
ough government penetration has been expanded under martial law, the 
munication responses have skillfully combined the mass media and 
mmunication techniques in order to resist the government and to contest 
e unequal struggle. This paper deals first with how the electronic media are regarded 
y both sides, and how the print media are left to articulate the ambiguities of these 
onfrontations. Second, it focusses on a national strike called a "hartal", in which the 
ous interests in the country faced each other in a unique form of silent confrontation 
which demonstrated the potency of the communication strategy of the populace. 
is particular hartal reveals a recumng pattern: popular response has been so 
ventive that martial law governments had to anticipate and accommodate to these 
ational strikes or hartals. While martial law governments have been highly 
entralized, the popular response has been diverse and diffuse, offering a thousand 
ints of resistance. What is interesting is how this asymmetry operates in 
ommunication terms for during the national strikes the government insisted on 
ness as usual, while its opponents declared that, on the contrary, everything had 
ped. The public consumption of these two views of history was primarily 
mediated by newspapers, radio, and television, but was enhanced by the lively oral 
contact which characterizes Bangladesh society. 
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Though there have been many martial law governments in Bangladesh, I 
focus on the regime of General Ershad between 1982 and 1986. Bangladesh inheri 
a legacy of military dictatorships from the period before 1971 when the country 
part of Pakistan. Between 1947 (independence from colonial control) and 1986 
Pakistan/Bangladesh was governed by martial law for 23 of the40 years, that is 5 
of the time (calculation based on Maniruzzaman, 1987, pp. 224 229). During 1971 
1986 Bangladesh was under martial law for ten of the 15 years, 66% of the time. 
first President of the newly created Bangladesh was Sheik Mujibur Rahman; in 1 
he was assassinated, and shortly afterward a coup put the martial law governmen 
Lieutenant-General Ziaur Rahman in power. President Zia slowly "civilianized" 
regime, allowing for limited political party freedom and transforming himself in 
popular politician who headed the Bangladesh National Party until his own assas 
tion in 1981. After Zia's assassination General H.M. Ershad led a bloodless coup, 
mitted civilian government for a few months, and imposed martial law again in 19 
Seeking to "civilianize" his regime from late 1984 onward, Ershad selective1 
martial law, as a means of forcing his political opponents to contest an election 
him while he still held out the threat of a return of complete military power. By 
cunning process he too sought to become a popular politician. Indeed, he succeed 
in forcing an election in May 1986, in which he was acclaimed as President; this w 
followed by a parliamentary election in November 1986 which saw Ershad's J 
party win two-thirds of the seats. Note that this paper does not analyze pressures 
other countries andfor agencies like the World Bank. For reasons of space the focus 
here is on internal pressures but external pressures (or their absence) cannot be ig- 
nored. 
Military, Media, and Social Control 
It is curious that a population of 100 million, so given over to free speech, accepts an 
sometimes seems to desire a martial law which necessarily entails full control 
communication. The Bengalis who form most of the population are known to all th 
neighbors as lovers of long conversations, romantic poetry, flamboyant rhetoric: 
say they love to communicate. This is a popular image they have of themselves. 
how is it that this huge number of people accept the rule of about 150,000 military an 
para-military men in uniform-men who value discipline and silence-when the rest 
of the population is disposed to form innumerable political parties, with noisy 
proliferating internal factions and elaborately competing ideologies? One seasoned 
Bangladeshi expert has concluded that: 
... the Bangladeshi political character thus combines seemingly incompatible 
elements. Bangladeshis have an unexpressed desire for discipline, a great 
leader and great issues. Even so, they also relish opposing and belittling all 
types of leadership, raising storms over nuances of political issues and 
defying organizational discipline of any kinds. The fitst set of characteristics 
helps them to turn crises into national triumphs. The second set incapacitates 
them from working in an organized way to deal with the enormous social, 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIAL ISSUE 69 
economic and political problems their country faces. This failure, in turn, 
perpetuates underdevelopment and stagnation and, if continued for long, 
could well erode all national self-confidence (Maniruzzaman, 1982, pp. 282 
These two strong tendencies, one toward open politics and communication and 
e other toward the closed system of martial law, are seldom balanced, often in con- 
on. This contention is reflected in the media, and which, to some extent, the media 
possible. Lieutenant-General Ershad presented himself in June 1982, shortly 
r imposing martial law, on the nation's TV screens. In a "fire-side chat" in english 
an interviewer, he discussed many aspects of the country's problems and his plans 
eal with them. Seated in his house, in civilian clothes, he answered the question 
y did the armed forces not take over the administration of the country earlier?" 
"We did not like to do so. Different quarters have requested me many a time to 
mulgate Martial Law. But we had unflinching faith in the political system and as 
result &d not pay heed to such requests." The text of the entire interview was sub- 
uently published in most newspapers in Dhaka (New Times, 1982). Not surpris- 
ly, Ershad's plan for the communications media was not discussed. What followed 
four years was the rule of arms and the politics of exhortation, repeating the pat- 
after the 1975 coup (Anderson, 1976). The exhortation was supposed to over- 
e the disenchantment and apathy produced by the rule of arms. The population 
exhorted to 'put the nation first', 'produce more food', and similar transcending 
eats. As the years went by, more and more of the exhortation occurred in and through 
media. Proof of this lies in the President's renewed cultivation of the media in 
5 and 1986, during his attempt to force an elechon. 
The properties of the various media are fully appreciated by the actors in the 
e. On one hand, there is the new, high-tech rigidity of state-owned television and 
lo with its capital-intensive electronic broadcasting monopoly. The martial law 
mment controlled radio and TV broadcasting and government leaders understand 
power which they use for their purposes. On the other hand the newspapers 
resent an abundant variety of presses and owners. Whether state-owned or simply 
lated by the state, newspapers are old technologies operating in a familiar com- 
ive boom and bust business cycle. Consequently control of the press is less com- 
ete than control of broadcasting. Each government under a political party has sought 
regulate and influence the press, but martial law governments seek to control and 
censor it more thoroughly. After all, martial law regulations provide severe penalties 
r imprisonment for anyone who criticizes the imposition, operation, or continuance 
f martial law, including spreading (by any means) "any prejudicial report which might 
create fear or alarm". Editorial comment on the government's performance is per- 
itted if it is supportive, if it politely points out unfinished business, or if it criticizes 
e government's yceived enemies. But comment on the military nature of govern- 
ment is forbidden. 
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Government Influence in the Media 
Even where literacy is low and people are poor, as in Bangladesh, the martial la 
administrators need the media's co-operation: after all, what is important is not ho 
many read, but who is actually reading, because of the great power of city and to 
elites. People in the media professions have their own objectives too: to improve 
standards of performance and to further their own careers. They also wor 
promote national development programs such as growing more food or limiti 
population. Finally, in order to decrease their vulnerability when there are dramah 
swings in the political climate, media personnel try to develop some autonomy fi 
the government by cultivating a popular base, or developing an additional outs 
income in advertising, films, theatre and consulting (Lent, 1984). 
During the four year period of Ershad's military rule, the media-government rela 
tion remained fundamentally volatile because the media necessarily reflected the 
sistence of a complex set of political oppositions to that rule. Government influe 
was matched by the media's own appetite for influence. With so little economic 
dependence, large parts of the media remained particularly vulnerable under m 
law. President Ershad was also vulnerable because he is reported to have feared medi 
accounts of his relations with a former mistress. He was also criticized because h 
remained in the Pakistan Army in 1971 and did nothing to bring about the emer 
of Bangladesh: his loyalties to family and country were suspect. Although h 
have tried to delay or soften these accounts, in the end they were put in circul 
what political effect they had among people who knew nothing before their publica- 
tion is not known, but his opponents hoped that this news would further discredit him. 
After the coup, a civilian, not a mihtary, Minister of Information and Broadcast 
ing was appointed in direct control of government-owned newspapers, includin 
operated by the Government's Trust, as well as Bangladesh Television, 
Bangladesh, the Mass Media Department, the Film and Publication Department, 
government-owned news agency (BSS), and the Film Development Corporation. 
government's numerous forms of regulation and influence were carried out thro 
the Ministry's Joint Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. Direct controls inc 
sight for censorship (at the beginning of Ershad's regime a military officer wa 
the preparation of TV news reports); threats of legal cases aimed at publishers w 
might lead to imprisonment; and outright seizure of a newspaper. There were eq 
ly powerful indirect influences, such as withholding government advertising; de 
ing, reducing, or withholding newsprint import quota permits; delaying forei 
exchange permits for purchase of equipment parts and repairs; interfering in the r 
a1 of working space; pursuit of costly and damaging criminal allegations aimed at 
individuals and their taxes, loans, etc.; transfer of government journalists 
central media offices to work for the less-prestigious government informati 
in outlying towns. Finally, the government could offer the reward-sometimes 
self-censorship-of appointments as ambassadors and press attaches in Banglad 
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embassies abroad; to travel to cover foreign sports events like the Olympics, and to 
accompany the President's entourage overseas to the United Nations, or the Common- 
wealth Summit meetings. 
In 1972 after the war the government was more or less forced into ownership of 
newspapers because many of them were the abandoned property of Pakistanis. Since 
then it has steadily divested itself: the Daily Observer was returned to its original 
owners; and the E m s ,  Dainik Bangla and Bichitra were transferred to a Board of 
Trustees established by the government. The extent of potential government influence 
over all print media, however, continues to be virtually total--whether it occurs under 
martial law or not, through a trust or not. 
Under former President Zia private ownership of the media began to flourish. 
Since Ershad brought an even stronger conviction that the private sector was to be the 
engine of growth and prosperity, he did not interfere with the transfer of the influen- 
tial Bangladesh Observer to its original owner Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, nor with the 
return to Sheikh Mujib's relatives of the Bangladesh Times, seized under the martial 
law in 1975. The Observer and the Times now dominate the English press. However 
Ershad, in a show of strength upheld the imprisonment of the popular editor of Naya 
Pratidhuni, arrested in 1582 for criticizing the secret trials and executions of military 
officers implicated in former President Zia's assassination (Lent, 1984, p. 21). The 
editor of the now outlawed BNP political party newspaper Dainik Desh was im- 
prisoned, and the newspapers Khubar and Sonar Bangla were closed down after Er- 
shad imposed martial law. Just before the twoday hartal in 1984 described below the 
BNP paper Dainik Desh was again banned by the government, putting 54 journalists, 
83 press workers, and 64 administrative workers out of their jobs (Bichitra, 7 Decem- 
ber 1984). Thus the two tendencies within the military were satisfied-censorship for 
some quarters, encouragement of the private press for others. 
In 1986, there were 56 registered newspapers with a total circulation of 583,000, 
in a country with a total population of 100 million. This is a 12% increase over total 
circulation of 521,000 in 1982 (Audit Bureau of Circulation, 1982; Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 18 September 1986).~ A high-level Press Commission proposed 
structural remedies to the govenunent in 1984, but few changes were implemented. 
Journalists went on strike more than once in the next two years in the hope of bring- 
ing attention to their conditions and the need to implement the Commission's recom- 
mendations. Ershad invited publishers to meet him in May 1986, at the time of his 
election, to discuss the state of the press, but the Minister of Information concluded 
the meeting was a failure-"soon they all were quarrelling among themselves," he said 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 September 1986). Ershad's objective was clear, 
despite full government power and control of electronic media, he needed a vigorous 
press to cany out his objectives, many of which (e.g., family planning) could not be 
achieved by coercion alone. 
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In 1986, at the time of transition from martial law to martial democracy t 
government reached daily audiences of four million people through about 4 
television sets. The Bangladesh Broadcasting Authority said that its TV mo 
was finally profitable: earnings in 1985-86 were Tk 140 million (45% from licensi 
fees, 55% from advertising), and expenses Tk 90 million (profit approx. $1.6 m 
US) (Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 September 1986). The TV station was al 
heavily guarded because it had been the target of previous military and civilian a 
tacks. In May 1986, during the election period, opposition politicians were offe 
prime-time on TV to explain their party's objectives--otherwise television news co 
tent is strictly controlled. To comprehend the relatively insignificant status 
television in Bangladesh one has to realize that a university assistant professor, gove 
ment deputy-secretary, or bank branch-manager would have had to pay, in 1984-8 
all their salary for six months (Tk 15,000) for a colour television set and three mon 
(Tk 7,500) for a black-and-white set. These sets were assembled in two Dutch 
Japanese factories in Bangladesh. In comparison a good quality radio with shortwave 
capacity would take 30% of one month's wages (Tk 800) at the same salary, and a 
month's subscription to a daily newspaper only 2%. 
Bangladesh Radio is also controlled by the same Broadcasting Authority but u 
like television, was reported to be losing money: Tk 120 million in 1986 for expe 
ses and Tk 32.5 million income from advertising and licensing earnings. Neverthele 
radio's audience is enormous-30 or 40 million people listen daily-which includes 
many who can't read and/or who will never have electricity (let alone a TV set). But, 
during the ham1 this same huge audience also listened to All-IndiaRadio, Radio Mos- 
cow, the BBC, the Voice of America, Radio Australia, Radio Beijing, etc.-not just 
for music, but for news. Despite these alternate foreign sources (or perhaps also be- 
cause of them), there was no challenge #om within the country to the government's 
dominance in radio. 
Unofficial or pirate-radio broadcasts were used once, during the popular opposi- 
tion to the Pakistan Army during 197 1, and appear to have been important to the con- 
duct of the guerilla-style combat waged by the Bangladeshis. 
Both (the Chittagong and Dhaka private broadcasting stations) became the 
first targets of the Pak army counter-attack. During the liberation war the 
radio was the primary medium of contact between the struggle and the captive 
population within Bangladesh .... This historic phase probably did more to 
expose the masses to the radio as a mass medium than any other event 
(Sobhan, 1977, p. 15 1). 
It is believed that this widely available technology has not, however, been used in 
near Bangladesh by opponents of any government since 197 1. 
The press in Bangladesh was thus in a condition quite similar to that described 
for Britain in the 19th century in the Introduction to this issue: as the costs of 
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tion rose, and as competition for elite audiences increased on 
smaller papers supported by a special constituency weakened. 
the British 'radical press' described by Curran, these 
enced the extra blow of having the political party which 
artial law. Those papers not party-supported but which 
to an ideological constituency could easily be further weakened by the 
f advertising, because in Bangladesh papers cannot afford to charge the 
r the cost of production. Government and corporate advertising could en- 
on into the bigger market, a market where (under martial law) 
discourse (except one) was to be avoided. Government could tell cor- 
h papers to advertize in. The strong pressures for self-censorship can 
. But add to this--quite different from Britain in the nineteenth the 
ment's profitable monopoly on broadcasting. Given that the mid- 
are very social and spend a great deal of time in one another's 
vision allowed them to while away the hours in conspicuous con- 
sition of curfew added to this sedentary way of life. Television 
even more popular in the hartal-not for news but for entertainment. The profit 
m this monopoly further weakened the economy of the newspapers. 
But beyond the mass media, away from the cities, the intensity and inmcacy of 
ral communication and personal influence in Bangladesh are legendary. Story- 
Hers, raconteurs and singers circulate among the enormous non-literate population. 
e weekly market there is an intense exchange of political information as well as 
s, services, and money. Travelling theatre companies treat current politics 
ough deceptively "historic" themes (like kings with too much power). Gatherings 
Saint's tombs or festivals provide a similar opportunity for discussing of the 
onomy and politics. Every bus and feny is a slowly moving seminar in the loud and 
expression of opinion-everyone can overhear, and anyone can join in. The tea 
s surrounding every law court have a similar function. Information can move at 
0 miles per hour, so there should be no presumption that control of the mass media 
f the airlines, railways or telephone system would paralyze the flow of popularly 
culated opinions or information throughout the country. It is this prolific and ver- 
character of communication that both martial law and its various oppositions 
to address in their strategies. This becomes clearer in the following detailed 
escription of one major confrontation in December 1984. 
Background of the Hartal 
Because, according to Bangladeshis, a hartal is different from a strike, the term hartal 
s used here: it means a period of noncooperation and non-participation and does not 
resume active civil disobedience or violence. Because it is a technique of indirect, 
ive confrontation with governments, however, it dares the military to overreact 
so the hartal has been the occasion of sporadic violence between troops and 
 crowd^.^ Schools, shops, banks, and businesses all close. Telephones, water supply, 
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electrical systems have so far been left functioning. Transport and communication 
the issues of contention-whether they will or won't operate is part of the game. 
importance of the term hartal, and the technique, is its totality-its intention is 
withdrawal and total denial. Thus, says Bondurant, forcing the opponent to make 
choice, like any 'well-launched demonstration' (Bondurant, 1971, p. 82). 
In spite of its capacities for control, from 1984 onward the martial law govern- 
ment was edging toward accommodating the press and allowing political parties and 
politicians to organize more freely. Each of these elements was prominently displayed 
in the dramatic national strike-a twoday hartal-in late December 1984. This har- 
tal, like others which followed, became the theatre for interplay between military and 
political leaders, the armed forces, the police, state broadcast media, the printed press, 
opposition political parties, students, labour unions, and unorganized people. It be- 
came a crucial test of the limits imposed by martial law, the culmination of ten months 
of mounting pressure which could have resulted in a coup against Ershad or the ter- 
mination of martial law through elections. 
Ershad was being tested by a heterogeneous set of political opponents who in- 
sisted that he hold elections soon, elections in which he himself would not be a con- 
testant. Parties opposing him were grouped in alliances led by two women, one a 
widow and the other a niece of assassinated Presidents. Apparently intending to un- 
dermine plans for the two-day hartal, President Ershad presented a package of com- 
promises including a promise to hold elections within four months. The opposition 
did not react to this package. But while apparently willing to hold elections, Ershad 
said nothing about stepping aside: in fact he seemed to be planning to participate per- 
sonally in elections. Would the party which formed around him disband, as the op- 
position demanded? This interplay, this theatre, was more than an entertaining game. 
The hartal framed and focussed the public's attention in an extraordinarily powerful 
fashion, and illuminated the malleability of the roles of the me&a under martial law. 
1984 became a difficult year for Ershad's government. There seems to have been 
disagreement at senior levels in the military as to whether elections should be held, 
but at the same time a gradual relaxation of military controls in news production and 
distribution. This produced curious advances and retreats on the part of the govern- 
ment. These two processes led the opposition parties to press harder for elections and 
demand media coverage for their own activities. Starting on 21 February 1984, a day 
of annual nationalist commemoration of the Bangla language, opposition politicians 
continuously tested the limits of martial law. For days afterward the familiar pattern 
of political meetings and demonstrations followed, and the predictable military 
response occurred. Since greater power was on the government's side, accusations of 
excessive use of force were levelled at both the police and military. Photographs of 
these confrontations featured in the influential magazine ~ i c h i t r a . ~  The deaths and 
injuries of civilians in February and March, at the hands of the police, are believed to 
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have had some effect on the unorganized public's attitude that this martial law regime 
was no longer impartial, (Bichitra, 7 December 1984). 
In August 1984, all newspapers, government-owned and privately-owned, closed 
down entirely because press workers went on a strike. Members of the same union, 
they were all demanding job-related issues be settled by implementation of the long- 
standing Commission of Enquiry into conditions for joumalists. During this month 
of strikes, government-owned radio and TV became the only domestic source of offi- 
cial news: since they carried little reportage about political activity, much was left to 
the public's imagination regarding the plans of opposition political parties. These par- 
ties were meanwhile quite busy. On 1 November an eight-hour ham1 was successfui- 
ly organized and five weeks later everything in the country was stopped for 24 hours. 
During this hartal eight press photographers working for various Dhaka daily 
newspapers (including a government-owned one) were beaten by police while they 
photographed a confrontation near the central mosque of Dhaka University. There 
was also an attack by unnamed persons on the home of a prominent TV interviewer 
and cultural organizer who was known to be allied with Ershad and his pofitical party. 
Moreover there were numerous attacks on the houses of leaders of opposition parties: 
although the police and army are reported to have been surprised by these attacks, in 
that they were without recent precedent, these attacks served to limit the recruitment 
of new members to the active opposition. 
The original idea for the two-day hartal was attributed to the Workers League 
(SKOP) which demanded that the government fully implement an "accord which was 
reached six months earlier. The opposition parties announced they would support the 
hartal, but did not make a show of campaigning for it. The government's response 
was that the financial aspects of the accord had already been implemented (Ershad 
said worker's wages had been doubled) while SKOP countered that legitimacy of 
unions provided in the accord had not been realized. But granting legal rights to 
unions, said the private sector Bangladesh Employers Association, would cripple the 
country's economic growth. Having decided that the satisfaction of employers would 
more valuable than popularity with the organized workers, the government took 
the Employer Association's position and did not implement the full accord. While this 
does not mean an equivalence of interests between the private sector and the military 
ovemment, their positions were mutually reinforced in opposition to the hartal. 
However, the foregoing story was not the explanation of the hartal that most 
ple gave. It was more commonly seen as an acute test of Ershad's nerve and con- 
If provoked would he and the military over-react? It seemed to be a game where 
the players hold their breath. During an eight-hour hartal the previous month, a labour 
leader and a 13-year-old boy were killed in separate incidents. Most opposition leaders 
were arrested during that shorter hartal, and later released. What would happen this 
me? It would be difficult to play this game without the mass media. The inherent 
differences between the newspapers, radio, and television, and their distinct relations 
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with their audiences played an important role in the hartal, but each was part of 
hart&. Not just their technical capability but also their relation to the present govem- 
ment influenced how each treated this episode, and how the govemment and people 
would approach each of media in future confrontations. 
Saturday in Bangladesh is like Sunday in most other countries. People were wor 
ing hard to get ready for the hartal: both the army and the housewives had to s 
Friday to plan, because up until the evening before there were rumours that a c 
promise might be reached between the govemment and opposition. Perhaps, thou 
some, it would all be called off. But on Friday positions were hardened. " 
will turn," the opposition said in the morning newspapers. In reply the g 
put on the nation's afternoon TV screens the text of a martial law order that all pub 
transport buses, femes, airlines, etc. would operate, and that officials would be in 
government offices during the next two days. The turning of wheels was offici 
defined as business as usual (Bangladesh Times, 18 December 1984) 
out of uniform, went to the influential Faridabad mosque for the Fri 
and gave a speech (shown on the evening TV news) on the virtues of brotherhood a 
unity and its significance for the nation's progress. Permission had also been given 
a fundamentalist Muslim politician to hold, at the same time as the noon prayer, a hu 
rally in front of the unused parliament buildings. Thousands were bussed to the 
spot where a week before Ershad (despite the fact that he had not personally 
ticipated in the freedom struggle) had reviewed the troops on the 13th anniversary 
the surrender of the Pakistan army and the birth of the country. Pious-looking 
men in fashionable middle eastern dress ran through the streets waving religiou 
chanting phrases from the Koran. 
The Hartal Begins 
At sundown the real prepatations began. Housewives went to the bazaars in drove 
in anticipation of two days of closure. Food sellers and hawkers were ready for the 
with much greater volumes and much higher pnces. There were long line-ups 
vehicles at the petrol pumps because refinery workers were expected to join the 
and thus there would be no delivery for three or four days. At the edges of the 
roads and other strategic spots in Dhaka, the army moved silently into place with truc 
and tents at dusk. On the dark and fractious university campus, students began th 
meetings which would soon be interrupted by noisy small bombs and assaults 
opposing students. Government officials were moving to inexpensive hotels near the 
offices, so they could conform to the government order, walk to work but not get 
a vehicle to traveI, and therefore partially observe the hartal. By midnight 
nothing was moving. 
At sunrise on Saturday December 22 people setting out for customary brisk walk 
in the suburbs of Dhaka were impressed by the silence. A huge city, with a popula 
tion of six million people, was becoming a village. Everyone commented on it. 
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little later in the morning, away from the main roads, some small shops quietly opened, 
construction workers dug foundations for a public school, and barbers snipped hair. 
"Hey observe the hartal," someone called at a young boy on a bicycle, but no one 
stopped him. In foreign-populated Gulshan a couple of cars drove on the side roads, 
but foreigners were supposed to be aware of the risk of having a brick tossed through 
the windshield if they drove during a hartal. Some young men in other parts of the 
city took this opportunity to abuse foreigners verbally, calling loudly at them with un- 
characteristic rudeness, in Bangla and English. The antinomian abnosphere was par- 
ticularly charged at key points such as the Farm Gate, where hundreds of young men 
strolled about and gawked at the soldiers. Observers said that instructions from the 
opposition parties forbade provocation of the military, but these alleged instructions 
were not made public. That would have undermined the game, and such party instruc- 
tions would not control all young men anyway. At one point three were seized, ar- 
rested, and whisked off within five minutes because an officer thought offensive, 
provocative remarks had been made to the police. A large procession in support of the 
ham1 was formed near the New Market, but it was broken up by the police and army 
with tear gas (Bichitra, 28 December 1984). 
By noon, before the call to prayer, women were strolling and kids were playing 
ball on streets usually packed with rickshaws. When prayers were over, however, the 
skies opened up to the thump of Air Force (U.S.) helicopters and the snarl of MiG 
fighters (practicing low above the city), communicating the message of power. This 
occurred while Ershad had lunch and rest. He had a very busy morning going to 
government offices and factories to see how they were operating, all of it dutifully 
recorded for the evening television news. Even the representations of business-as- 
usual changed during the hartal. For example, viewers later said the televised events 
were staged because the bureaucrats sat and worked while the President moved around, 
whereas normally they stop and stand at attention. 
Sitting on a roof, one could see the same pattern all afternoon-little spotter planes 
flying circuits across the city followed three minutes later by big helicopter gun ships, 
running around at the cost of $800 US per hour. But it turned out the real confronta- 
tion was occurring somewhere else. In the northern district capital of Rajshahi a crowd 
was trying to barricade the scheduled departure of a train. A magistrate bringing an 
order to disperse was surrounded by the crowd; tear gas was used by the police to clear 
the crowd. Shots were fired by the police which left a hawker and a student dead in 
their tracks. Ershad decided then to order students to vacate university residences on 
all campuses by Sunday morning; these residences are sources of continuous and oc- 
casionally violent opposition to the government, and custom once inhibited the police 
and army from penetrating the campuses too far. Under martial law, however, this 
custom was disregarded. Would the students move out with the bodies of martyrs 
led in Rajshahi in their custody? 
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That Saturday evening the state-controlled TV news revealed none of this. A w 
earlier student groups had threatened to seize the broadcasting facilities because of 
handling of the TV news. But no trace of the hartal appeared on the screen this e 
ning; no mention was made of the 555 arrests made today, in Dhaka alone. Inste 
viewers saw lengthy footage of a couple of rickshaws rolling self-consciously on th 
streets, of ferry boats at wharves, busy offices, and humming factories. There wer 
shots of Ershad amidst the typewriters, and his military deputies loohng at fertiliz 
production-all screened with little comment. These shots could have been taken th 
day before. With all meetings banned by the edict of the day before, no oppositi 
voices spoke; for them, the evident successes of the hartal had already contradict 
the government's claim of peace and business-as-usual. When the news was ove 
people stopped laughing and sat back to watch an old American sit-com. The radi 
reverted to popular songs. 
A Second Day 
Sunday, 23 December opened with the BBC and Radio Australia news at 5 a. 
announcing shootings and arrests, and with the Voice of America saying oppositio 
leaders were determined to continue the hartal today. Neither radio Moscow nor Radi 
Peking mentioned Bangladesh. All-India Radio described the ham1 in measur 
terms, pointing out it would last two days. Surprisingly one found both sides 
yesterday's story in The Bangladesh Observer: the Rajshahi confrontation, the death 
the arrests, as well as the government's announcement of "situation peaceful". Th 
paper used a circumlocutious method to deal with Ershad's offer of an election: in 
front page story that day on the police tear-gassing of opponents to General Zia 
Pakistan, "it may be mentioned," the paper said, that Ershad had been the first to se 
congratulations to Zia following his questionable referendum victory as President in 
Pakistan two days earlier, while few other national leaders had done so. This suggested 
that a similar phoney referendum victory was all that Ershad could expect. 
After breakfast on Sunday there was more activity on the streets. The spotter 
planes were up early. Trucks occasionally raced along the main roads. One convoy 
of civilian cars careened behind an ambulance full of policemen, its sirens blaring. 
Students lingering too long at campus residences were removed by force. And a few 
rickshaws were braving the streets alone: jesters declared that the opposition ran out 
of money to pay them not to operate (there are thousands of rickshaws in the capital), 
while others said perhaps the government paid them more to operate today than the 
opposition did to stop them yesterday. Some trains actually left the railway station. 
But there were opponents of this looser atmosphere who said the hartal's objective 
was getting lost. Thus two government buses were attacked with small bombs, two 
rickshaws were smashed up in old Dhaka by angry groups, and an open shop was 
damaged, its owner roughed up. Some old scores were being settled under the an- 
tinomian atmosphere, setting examples of discipline for the future. In the media these 
attackers were called "miscreants," an old and oft-used British colonial term coming 
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the archaic French "one who does not believe". Again the television cameras 
lled to record everything that moved, but missed Sunday's 217 arrests in Dhaka. 
harged with "picketing and provoking members of law enforcement agencies", these 
ple were sent to crowded holding areas or, if beaten and injured, to hospital wards. 
In outlying areas, where 85% of the population lives, the ham1 was even more 
plete. The army was on full-alert in each of the 68 district towns (Bichitra, 28 
ember 1984). The govemment put less energy there into trying to achieve and 
normalcy in the district towns at least for radio and television. So in district 
s, because there was no attempt at business as usual, there were no significant 
me&a reports. The role of TV is important among the elite in dismct towns and of 
course in other big cities like Chittagong and Khulna. Although there are independent 
newspapers in other cities and district towns, Dhaka newspapers (in Bangla and 
English) are read within a day of publication in virtually every village in the country. 
The news on national radio is treated with caution, and villagers certainly listen con- 
sistently to short wave broadcasts in Bangla from foreign agencies. Despite different 
conditions in outlying towns and cities, arrests occurred there too. Martial law is 
geared to the quick disposal of cases, so these people would not necessarily languish 
without trial. Those among them who would work for opposition parties if an elec- 
tion was held were often held on spurious charges. 
At noon on Sunday the MiG fighters cruised around again, drowning out the 
muezzein's call to prayer. The streets were warm and lazy, as salaried people declared 
an extra holiday and strolled to friends' houses. Those living on daily wages-like 
carpenters' groups waiting on street comers to be hired-said they were suffering from 
the hartal. Little attention was paid to the helicopters overhead, though high tension 
prevailed at strategic spots where crowds confronted military and police. Elsewhere, 
however, the troops and police seemed determined to appear relaxed, and in some 
quieter places sat down at the edge of the road when not on patrol. Sophisticated im- 
ported communication technologies allowed them to move quickly into action while 
maintaining an unobtrusive profile in the shade. To some people Sunday afternoon 
provided a sense of relief that major confrontations had not occurred, but in other more 
litical quarters this quietude was disappointing. The gradual relaxation showed that 
the long ham1 was not universally popular; people were glad the tension had lifted. 
On Sunday evening the TV news footage of normalcy and peacefulness was back- 
up by lengthy treatment of an afternoon Cabinet meeting chaired by Ershad. New 
licies on shrimp culture were announced, but no official reference was made to the 
ond day of the hartal. Long lingering shots of a train, a few rickshaws, two aircraft 
ing off, and govemment office workers were televised, again with relatively little 
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Public Perceptions 
On the following Monday morning the newspapers ran stories in which o 
parties announced they would hold special prayer meetings for the two 
at Rajshahi. The hartal was declared a success by the opposition, 
mentioned about the arrests. There were line-ups outside banks; when they had 
at noon on the previous Thursday, three and a half days without transactions heig 
rumours of devaluation of the taka. Here was a perfect opportunity, some thoug 
plan and execute a devaluation and avoid a rush at the banks. But no devalu 
occurred; plainly the President was looking for legitimacy and would not 
unpopular policies like devaluation if they occurred during a hartal. 
The day's conversations revolved around whether the experience was really 
any use to the opposition-they had expanded the hartals up from four-hour to eig 
hour to a two-day affair-and whether it made an impact upon Ershad. "He has 
popular support," said a senior advisor to successive government administrations, " 
until now he himself has not acknowledged it. Others have told him. But he avo1 
seeing the facts. Did he get the full message this time?" Popular analysis in Eng 
and Bangla included the customary resort to tribal arguments: "As a people we 
basically anti-Establishment" and "I tell you we Bengalis need a very strong man 
run this country properly". Some of the arguments were reminiscent of national har- 
tals more than ten years before, in President Sheikh Mujib's time; this is a classic dis- 
course because under Pakistan and Bangladesh these same people have survived 
numerous martial law administrations. (Jahan, 1980; Ahamed, 1980; Hyman, 1983). 
It mattered little whom one asked for explanations: rickshawallahs an 
businessmen alike, housewives, scientists and cooks-whether committed or indif- 
ferent to "politics"-said that the occurrence of this major hartalproved that the present 
government enjoyed no deep popularity, and that the government apparatus worked 
for Ershad only under duress. Some insisted that one should not conclude the hartal 
was popular either, afraid of repraisal, almost everyone conformed. Their intuition 
was not far from expert analysis, such as that of Maniruzzaman's view (1987, p. 108) 
that: 
... a military regime that does not seem to have the support of any of the major 
civilian groups continues to hold power in Bangladesh (1982-1986), only 
because of active competition between the two major political parties -- the 
Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party. If the leaders of these 
leading political parties could moderate their exmme partisanship and enter 
into a national compact ... the 'iron will'of the present Bangladesh junta would 
quickly wilt, and the civilian political process would soon revive. 
And who, asked "non-political" people, are the opposition? Have we not seen 
them all before? Is there a new idea or great leader among them? We do want some- 
thing to happen, they said, because in our present situation we are simply stuck. No 
political evolution is taking place. People wanted Ershad to admit to himself what 
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one else knew. Would he neutralize himself and hold an election, withdrawing 
or less gracefully? Or would he engineer areferendum with himself at the centre, 
', and carry on like General Zia in Pakistan? Here is the dead centre of politics 
The denouement of this story is stunning in its speed. On 16 January 1985, three 
ks after this hartal, most functions of martial law were dissolved. Its special courts 
to function, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was restored. Saying he 
"restored fundamental rights," General Ershad asked the Chief Election Commis- 
er to prepare plans for an April election. The Bangladesh Times described 
shad's expectation expressed at a news conference thus: 
... he firmly looked forward to co-operation from national mass media like 
radio, television, newspapers and movies. He said that the role of the media 
was especially helpful in the discharge of the responsibilities vested in him. 
In its editorial the following day (17 January 1985), the Xmes optimistically an- 
nounced: 
Judged by the general standards of Third World politics, where Martial Law 
rule is a common phenomenon, the situation is unique .... Apeaceful transition 
to democracy should not be a difficult task now. 
Announcing that GDP was up by 4.5%, that agricultural production was up 4.7% 
over the preceding year, and that there was a healthy balance of payments surplus, Er- 
shad threw himself into campaigning against the two women who led the opposition 
party coalitions. Seven weeks later when nomination papers were to be filed, however, 
these same leaders decided to boycott the elections. Swiftly the military reacted: the 
national elections were cancelled and martial law fully reinstated. As if calling the 
bluff of the opposition, Ershad closed the universities indefinitely, put the political op- 
ition leaders under house arrest and outlawed all political parties. During the six 
ks in which martial law was dissolved and party politics allowed, moreover, he is 
reported to have complained "public life has become miserable." 
Instead of an election Ershad then held a quick referendum on his policies and 
leadership: those few who voted did so very supportively, and he said his mandate 
was renewed. The demand in the military for total control appeared to have won. In 
order to extend his influence beyond the cities, Ershad permitted rural "countyn-level 
(thana) elections in which political parties had to act in disguise, the way political par- 
ties do in many civic elections in Canada. He offered the press its continued measure 
of independence. But this has often happened before. 
Throughout the rest of 1985 Ershad attempted to draw the opposition parties into 
an election, and tried to amplify the differences between the Awami League alliance 
and the BNP alliance. There were more hartals along the way, including a major one 
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but failed. One opposition party alliance contested the election, the other did not. 
Martial law was finally dissolved, and by September 1986 Ershad had retired from ac 
tive military service. However, because he was President, Ershad remained chief o 
the armed forces, and chief martial law administrator. With control of the reactivat 
parliament in 1986, Ershad's party was seeking passage of an indemnity bill whic 
would legalize all the actions of the martial law regime between 1982 and 1986. Thus 
during 1986 we see the creation of what was called a "martial democracy", through 
which a new ruling group claimed a retrospective legitimacy. During 1987 and 1988 
the opposition organized more national strikes; yet despite their intention to topple the 
government and despite the accompanying repression, Ershad remained in power. 
Conclusions 
The evidence offered here shows that people who have lived under martial law for 
many years, who are said to be incapable of working co-operatively in an organized 
way and to have a desire for imposed discipline, can nevertheless sustain a major 
national "strike" or hartal. It also shows this was achieved without access to televisi 
or radio, even pirate broadcasting. The telephone system is used by few persons, was 
not confidential, and was subject to failures. Newspapers and magazines, despite low 
literacy rates, were an important source of news about the hartal but those too were 
slow, and subject to censorship, closure or confiscation. But limits on the use of mass 
media were easily overcome by alternate means of communication. 
In the hartal native genius evolved apowerful form of communication long before 
martial law. Amessage is delivered from the powerless to the powerful by doing noth- 
ing: it is a play upon action and inaction, a show of passive resistance in the face of 
the active rule of arms. This communication through the hartal evolved intimately 
with the broadcast media and the press, without which an event of this scale would be 
difficult to organize. But even if the government were to seize and shut the media 
down entirely, the hartal could still occur: it was not staged for the media, and was 
not a "mediaevent". A message can move across Bangladesh within twenty-four 
hours without modem media because information passes so rapidly by word of mouth. 
The hartal is itself a medium of communication. It is a display of the powers of the 
weak. But by their treatment of the hartal, their confinnation that it succeeded here 
or failed there, the media used this big ham1 in 1984 as an instrument by which to 
gauge their own proximity to and/or autonomy from martial law. Various publics ex- 
tended their own restricted experience of geography and politics to a conception of 
the whole country, by relying on their interpretation of the media treatment of the har- 
tal. In this circular way, the ham1 and its media treatment were crucial influences 
upon political changes within the country, with the ham1 creating a theatre for a 
dialogue under martial law between two forms of power-arms and public opinion. 
The pattern has been repeated in subsequent major hartals, constantly testing the reac- 
tion of the military leaders. 
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Throughout Bengal a game (kabbaddz) is played in which players on opposing 
sides must hold their breath: alternately cunning, force and speed, are required toover- 
come one's opponents. Holding one's breath sets a time limit on any episode in the 
game. Episodes like this hartal were played while the Bangladeshis held their breath. 
They also had a sense of deja vu, having played the game before. And yet a time limit 
was imposed upon this episode also-two days. Each hartal is the same. Long enough 
to stop everything and prove a point, short enough to keep people's attention on the 
game. Divisions within the military government, a temporary consensus among 
politicians, and a willingness to experiment among the public were met with special 
determination on the part of the media. Although some people expected the end of 
martial law as a result of one hartal or another, they were supported in this idea only 
for a few weeks only. The pressures of food shortages, economic problems and popula- 
tion growth were unrelenting. These moments in history came again, and again. They 
are, after all, cumulative--each moment pressed its weight upon the popular con- 
sciousness, sending a message for change. 
In the complex relation of the communication media to the martial law, people's 
expectations for this government were communicated, in part, through the media, 
where most of their concomitant disappointments were displayed. Although the reach 
of the press, radio, and TV is limited, these conflicting states of feeling were clearly 
communicated to the rulers. Evidence suggests that TV is considered a hot medium, 
requiring total government control. Newspapers seemed to be considered a cooler 
medium capable of selfdiscipline (or self-censorship) and therefore not worth the ef- 
fort of total control. That newspapers and magazines are not prevented from dealing 
with news which TV and radio avoid is not due to military indifference to the conse- 
quences of an uncontrolled press. The real reason for this degree of freedom lay in 
the fact that the martial law administration had also to govern against rumour and thus 
needed a credible form of expression in the written press. Those in the military and 
Cabinet who advocated for total control have not always overcome those who argued 
for a minimal management of opponents. Total control takes so much disciplined ef- 
fort: minimal management is so much easier. Like previous governments before his, 
Ershad's regime has many other complex economic development problems to face in 
addition to its relationship to the mass media. 
This martial law government, like others which achieved power by coup or by 
ce, had a special need to transform its legitimation crisis into an advantage. Even 
with enormous power this government subjected itself to the test of the hartal, because 
to acquire legitimacy and retain control it had to undergo a test of strength; to tolerate 
the hartal, as it tolerated the existence of political parties. As has each previous govern- 
ment in Bangladesh, Ershad's government relied on foreign aid for most of its develop- 
ment budget, new investment, and some recurrent costs. This tolerance, at times 
'repressive tolerance', arose because the military's enormous power was still insuffi- 
cient to govern the country effectively. It had to rely on an educated and compliant 
civil service. In this context it may appear necessary to tolerate a certain "freedom of 
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the press" (by local definitions) not only because it is a sign of "legitimate" gove 
ment (a value in itself) but also because this freedom constitutes a tactical advan 
to the government. After all, as President Ershad said, the media was especial 
ful in the discharge of responsibilities vested in him. The rule of arms and the 
of exhortation thus remains the central fact of communication. 
End Notes 
1. This prohibition excludes an important sector of the economy from discus 
Although the reported size of the military1 paramilitary forces fluctuates slig 
(159,000 in 1984,146,000 in 1986), the military budget has climbed steadil 
1984 military expenditures were 18.48% of a11 public expenditure, and 19. 
in 1985 according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Lon 
compared to 11.9% for China, 21.5% for India, and 26.0% for Pakistan 
Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1987 Yearbook, December 1987). Estima 
expenditure in 1984-85 was $273.36 million US, and given the nature of 
military-industrial capability in the country much of this expenditure was 
foreign exchange outside the country. Nevertheless the military had significa 
economic relations with the rest of the country, although these were large 
unstudied. 
2. The pro-business, pro-western daily Ittefaq had the largest circulation (200 
the weekly Jayjaydin was the largest magazine (100,000), and the po 
weeklies Bichitra (40,000) the most influential in Bangla and Holiday th 
influential in English. Note that Ittefaq would be read by, or read to, or 
about, among at least five times as many people as the 200,000 narn 
circulation audits. The government-run news agency BSS was the sole distri 
of foreign news within Bangladesh (Reuters, Xinhua, Press Trust of India, 
etc.) and its tiny budget was made up of a government grant, oblig 
subscriptions from the country's newspapers, and fees for distribution. Fo 
reporters visited or worked in Bangladesh under government supervision an 
they annoy the government they are expelled. 
3. Widely used during the Indian and Pakistan independence movements, includi 
by Gandhi, a major hartal occurred in Bengal when Lord Curzon partition 
Bengal into East and West in 1905. Hartal is not a Bangla word, but a com 
term fmm "haw" (which in Sanskrit means market) and "tal" (from tala me 
lock) borrowed from Hindi. A green banner called a "harital" was appare 
in the Mughal period to signify the closure of a market for any special p 
not necessarily signifying a protest The hartal developed in conjunction wi 
19th century innovation the industrial strike which began in India, in the ra 
textile and jute mills. The hartal also drew on older traditions of agrarian 
which acquired special significance under the colonial administration becau 
fear that protest in one area could be communicated orally to other areas, fuel 
a general uprising. (On agrarian protests in east Bengal, see Bose, 1986). I 
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grateful to Peter Harnetty, Hari Sharma, and John Wood for &sussion of this 
point. By 1900 the hartal had acquired the exclusive meaning of protest and 
resistance which included the business class. 
Why Bichitra is not banned is inmguing. Allied to the high circulation daily 
Dainik Bangla (both owned by the government's arm's-length Trust), Bichitra's 
workers are all government employees in a technical sense. Its circulation grew 
from 36,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in 1986, and is one of the few government 
publications which is profitable. "Hot" news takes a week to appear in Bichitra, 
by which time it has "cooled off' slightly. Nevertheless the magazine has 
maintained a tradition of critical writing throughout Bangladesh's history and is 
also a major vehicle for poets and fiction writers. Its profitability and stature has 
probably outweighed its nuisance value. 
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